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No. 170 y September 2008 
 
ell before the French 
Presidency took over the 
European Council in 
July 2008, it was well known that 
immigration was going to constitute 
one of its central priorities. The 
French enthusiasm coincided with 
an increasing interest by Barroso’s 
Commission in this domain.
1 The 
French government and the 
European Commission started to 
fine-tune their respective strategies and ‘the way 
forward’ through a series of informal meetings. This 
materialised in the presentation of two policy outputs: 
First, a Commission Communication on a Common 
Immigration Policy for Europe and another on a Policy 
Plan on Asylum;
2 and second, various drafts of the 
French Presidency’s European Pact on Immigration and 
Asylum, the latest of which appeared on September 
3rd. This Policy Brief refers to all previous drafts 
offered up for public comment so far.   
The intersection between these initiatives raises a 
number of questions: First, what are the nature, context 
and key issues of the Pact? Does it present anything 
really new to the current state of affairs in EU law and 
policy? Second, does the EU really need a pact on 
immigration and asylum, given the ongoing processes 
of Europeanisation surrounding these policy domains? 
And third, is the logic driving the Pact fully compatible 
with the interests of the EU interests and the 
                                                      
1 Commission Communication, The European Interest: 
Succeeding in the Age of Globalisation, COM(2007) 581 final, 
Brussels 3.10.2007. See Bigo, et al., (2008).  
2 Commission Communication, A Common Immigration Policy 
for Europe: Principles, Actions and Tools, COM(2008) 359 
final, 17.6.2008, Brussels. Commission Communication, Policy 
Plan on Asylum: An Integrated Approach to Protection across 
the EU, COM(2008) 360, 17.6.2008, Brussels. 
Commission’s priorities, or does it rather represent a 
competing model between ‘more Europe’ and the 
principle of subsidiarity over immigration, borders and 
asylum? 
I.  The European Pact on Immigration and 
Asylum: Context and Key Issues 
The Pact constitutes a political document, and therefore 
a non-legally binding act, providing the general lines 
and principles expected to guide future EU policies on 
immigration, asylum and border management. Indeed, 
it needs to be read in conjunction with the current 
policy processes paving the way for the adoption of the 
next multi-annual (five-year) programme in the fields 
related to an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(AFSJ).
3 The successor to the current Hague 
Programme
4 is expected to be agreed under the 
auspices of the Swedish Presidency sometime during 
the second half of 2009. The French Presidency 
therefore aims at having an early impact on these 
                                                      
3 Among other ongoing processes, see the Report by the Future 
Group (2008). 
4 Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 4 and 5 
November 2004, 14292/1/04, Brussels, 8 December 2004, 
Annex I, “The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, 
Security and Justice in the European Union”, point 1.5. 
2005/C53/01, OJ C53/1, 3.3.2005. 
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processes by getting the Council to agree on a set of 
common principles upon which the future policy 
agenda on immigration and asylum will be established 
and developed during the period 2009-2015 in this 
regard. The Pact states: “The programme that will be 
the successor of the Hague Programme in 2010 will, in 
particular, enable the Pact to be transposed further into 
practical actions.” 
The Pact has been through a number of drafts and 
amendments so far, many of which have not been made 
publicly available. Most recently, a public version of 
the text was discussed at the JHA Council meeting in 
Brussels on 24-25
th July 2008.
5 At this meeting the 
Council took account of the “broad measure of 
agreement” reached between member state 
representatives at the informal JHA Council meeting in 
Cannes on 7-8
th July 2008, and proposed its adoption at 
the next European Council Summit of October 15-16
th. 
A new non-official version was circulated at the 
beginning of September.
6 
What are the key issues addressed in the Pact? The text 
proposes concrete measures in relation to a set of 
common principles labelled as “basic political 
commitments”. The five commitments are expressly 
stipulated as follows: 
First, organise legal immigration to take account of the 
priorities, needs and reception capacities determined by 
each member state, and encourage integration. 
Second, control irregular immigration by ensuring the 
return of irregular aliens to their country of origin or a 
country of transit. 
Third, make border controls more effective. 
Fourth, construct a Europe of asylum. 
Fifth, create a comprehensive partnership with the 
countries of origin and transit to encourage the synergy 
between migration and development. 
It therefore calls upon the European Council to adopt 
the concrete actions as outlined in the sections below, 
in order to give shape to these five common tenets. 
1.1. Legal  Migration 
The Pact states that it is for each member state to 
determine its legal migration needs including “the 
conditions of admission” and quotas. It suggests that 
this should be done in conjunction with countries of 
origin. The Pact uses the term “immigration choisie” or 
selective immigration, which has been quite 
                                                      
5 The July 4
th version of the Pact is available at 
www.libertysecurity.org. See also JHA Council Meeting 2287
th, 
Brussels, 24 and 25 July 2008, 11653/08. 
6 The September 3
rd non-official version of the Pact is 
available at www.statewatch.org 
contentious in France. It recommends selective 
immigration policies to be developed by the member 
states taking into account the perceived needs in their 
own labour markets and the potential impact that 
domestic policies will have on other member states. 
Further harmonious integration of third country 
nationals (TCNs) and fair treatment are also considered 
to be key factors in determining selective immigration. 
It then encourages the member states (rather than the 
European Commission or the EU) to: 
•  Make the EU an attractive place for highly 
qualified TCNs and to take further measures to 
facilitate the admission and movement of students. 
The Pact does not mention the Commission’s 
proposal for a directive on the conditions of entry 
and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purposes of highly qualified employment, often 
qualified as the Blue Card Initiative.
7 
•  Privilege systems for temporary and circular 
migration. 
•  Regulate family migration “more effectively” – 
each member state assessing its integration 
capacities for family members, in particular 
regarding support and accommodation needs and 
language knowledge. The Pact does not mention 
the Council Directive 2003/86 on the right to 
family reunification for TCNs, which sets out EU- 
wide hard law on the conditions for family 
reunification and which applies in all member 
states (except Denmark, Ireland and the UK).
 8 
•  Improve information on migration and the tools 
available, and foster the creation and use of 
databases on migration and TCNs. 
•  Create integration policies that are based on a 
“balance between migrants’ rights and duties” with 
a particular emphasis on measures promoting 
language acquisition and access to employment, 
and stressing “respect both for national identities 
of member states and the European Union and 
their fundamental values”. It also calls on member 
states “to take into account, … the need to combat 
any forms of discrimination to which migrants 
might be exposed”. 
•  Exchange information and best practices on 
reception and integration of TCNs on the basis of 
national policies.
9 The Pact refers to the EU 
                                                      
7 See the Commission’s Proposal for a Council Directive on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for 
the purposes of highly qualified employment, COM(2007) 637 
final, Brussels, 23.10.2007. See E. Guild (2007).  
8 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the 
right to family reunification, OJ L 251/12, 3.10.2003. 
9 See Carrera (2008) for a critique. The French Presidency’s European Pact on Immigration and Asylum | 3 
Framework on Integration and the Common Basic 
Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy 
adopted by the Council in November 2004.
10 
1.2. Irregular  Migration 
The Pact continues to use the term ‘illegal’ migration, 
which is no longer favoured in international circles 
where immigration is under discussion. The alternative 
terms, such as ‘irregular’ or ‘undocumented’ migration 
are much less normatively charged and many 
international institutions consider that they enhance the 
possibilities for discussion. Under this heading the Pact 
calls for three specific actions: 
•  The reinforcement of cooperation among member 
states and countries of origin and transit to fight 
irregular immigration, taking into account the need 
for a ‘Global Approach to Migration’. 
•  The expulsion or departure of all TCNs irregularly 
on the territory of a member state; here the 
member states are expected to take action against 
persons irregularly present. It is also said that 
“each Member State undertakes to ensure that this 
principle is effectively applied with respect for the 
law and for the dignity of the persons involved, 
giving preference to voluntary return”. Further, the 
Pact calls for the application of Directive 2001/40 
on the mutual recognition of expulsion decisions 
of TCNs
11 – the result of a Portuguese proposal 
before the Commission had a monopoly over 
legislation. This last Directive has proved very 
unpopular among the member states and all 
evidence shows it is little used. In its nature it is an 
intergovernmental style of Directive as it is based 
on the mutual recognition of expulsion decisions; 
for that reason is very difficult for officials to 
make use of it. 
•  The proposition that all states are required to admit 
their nationals (which as a position in international 
law is not so clear – states cannot refuse entry to 
their nationals but that is a different obligation 
from admitting their nationals if they have not 
expressed an individual desire to re-enter). On the 
basis of the proposition, the Pact calls for a wide 
range of measures including agreements with third 
countries to enforce expulsion measures. 
1.3. Border  Controls 
The Pact calls for six measures with mixed 
responsibilities between the member states and the EU 
                                                      
10 Council of the European Union, Justice and Home Affairs 
Council Meeting 2618
th, Brussels, “Common Basic Principles 
on Immigrants Integration”, 14615/04, 19 November 2004. 
11 Council Directive 2001/40/EC on the mutual recognition of 
decisions on the expulsion of third country nationals of 28 May 
2001, OJ L 149, 2.6.2001. 
institutions. A strong intergovernmental approach is 
also evident here in the sentence “the European Council 
recalls that each Member State is responsible for the 
controls of its section of the external border”. These 
measures include the requirement to: 
•  Improve external frontier controls at all external 
borders; 
•  Ensure that biometric visas are ready for issue 
everywhere by 1
st January  2012; 
•  Provide more powers and resources to FRONTEX 
(the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of 
the member states of the European Union) to carry 
out temporary or permanent border control 
operations (specialised offices) and potentially to 
consider the setting up of a European system of 
border guards;
12 
•  Continue to develop modern technologies and 
electronic systems of entry and exit (presumably 
accompanied by databases) and make the existing 
databases interoperable within the context of the 
EU’s integration border management strategy;
13 
•  Develop cooperation with countries of origin and 
transit of migrants in order to reinforce border 
controls, including further training and improving 
equipment; and 
•  Improve the modalities and frequency of Schengen 
border control evaluations.
14 
1.4. Asylum 
The Pact is complimentary to the progress that has been 
made in the asylum field in recent years, with no 
mention of criticism from UNHCR, but an 
acknowledgement of the challenge presented by the 
increasing divergence across the member states in 
recognition rates among asylum-seekers from the same 
countries of origin (such as Iraq). In order to improve 
the situation, the Pact recognises that the reinforcement 
of external border controls must not prove an obstacle 
to the protection of refugees but gives no suggestion as 
to how to achieve this. Four actions are foreseen: 
•  The creation in 2009 of a bureau or European 
Support Office that would facilitate information 
exchange and practical administrative cooperation 
on asylum, but would have no power to give 
definitive instructions or decisions. The Office 
would “use the shared knowledge of countries of 
                                                      
12 Jeandesboz (2008); Carrera (2007). 
13 Carrera et al., (2007). Commission Communication, Preparing 
the next steps in border management in the European Union, 
COM(2008) 69 final, 13.2.2008. 
14 Faure (2008). 4 | Carrera & Guild 
origin to harmonise national practices, procedures 
and consequently decisions”. And notably: 
•  Establish a single asylum system by 2012 with 
common standards on refugee protection and 
subsidiary protection; sadly, the disparities in 
recognition rates among the member states are 
not the result of different substantive 
interpretations of the existing directives in the 
field but rather a different appreciation of the 
facts, particularly in countries of origin; 
•  Put into place procedures to deal with a 
‘massive influx’ of asylum seekers that would 
allow the ‘lending’ of officials among the 
member states and effective solidarity 
(unspecified);  
•  Reinforced cooperation with UNHCR with a 
possible resettlement programme within the EU 
and a system of cooperation with third countries 
to reinforce their protection capacities; and  
•  The provision of training on fundamental rights 
of “persons in need of protection” to the 
personnel responsible for external border 
controls.  
1.5.  Migration and Development 
Under this heading the Pact again notes the EU’s 
Global Approach to Migration.
15 It foresees a 
relationship between irregular migration, legal 
migration and development, particularly in the east and 
the south of the EU. Under this heading the Pact has 
eight proposals: 
•  Agreements either at the EU level or bilaterally 
with countries of origin and transit which include 
provisions on legal migration, irregular migration, 
readmission and development;  
•  Member states should consider offering legal 
migration possibilities to countries, particularly for 
temporary purposes (circular migration); 
•  Develop policies within third countries to inhibit 
and combat irregular migration; 
•  Integrate immigration policies with their 
development counterparts; 
•  Support development projects that allow TCNs to 
invest at home; 
•  Prepare a second ministerial conference in the 
Euro-Africa programme; 
•  Accelerate the implementation of tools developed 
in the Global Approach that provide for ‘migration 
                                                      
15 Commission Communication, The Global Approach to 
Migration one year on: Towards a Comprehensive European 
Migration Policy, COM(2006) 735 final, Brussels, 30.11.2006. 
balances’, ‘cooperation platforms’ and 
‘partnerships for mobility’ and ‘circular migration 
programmes’ to be established and a balance 
between migratory routes in the south and the east 
within the framework of readmission agreements. 
In this regard, it is necessary to underline that the 
Council has already concluded two mobility 
partnerships with Cape Verde and Moldova 
covering these issues, and is negotiating similar 
agreements with Senegal and Georgia;
16 and 
•  Develop the migration perspectives of the 
Neighbourhood Policy. 
II.  Innovative Elements of the Pact: 
Nationalism and Intergovernmentalism 
In light of the above, can we identify anything truly 
innovative in the principles and policy initiatives 
provided by the Pact? There seems to be very little that 
is new in a majority of the measures. Most of them are, 
or have been, already part of previous initiatives and/or 
discussions coming from some member states, the 
Council, the European Commission and other EU 
institutional actors. In addition to its purported political 
significance, perhaps one of the most innovative 
elements characterising the Pact on Immigration and 
Asylum is the very nature of some of the policies being 
proposed, which are in our view, driven by two distinct 
guiding principles: nationalism and 
intergovernmentalism.  
2.1. Nationalism 
The Pact includes certain initiatives greatly inspired by 
current French legislation and public policies dealing 
with immigration and integration. The strategy of the 
French Government has been to bring supranational 
legitimacy to some of its current priorities, visions and 
laws affecting human mobility and social inclusion and 
to transform them to some extent into European trends. 
This is most especially evidenced when looking at 
some of the actions put forward by the Pact in relation 
to family reunification, integration and labour 
immigration. By means of illustration, the Pact calls for 
regulating “more efficiently” family reunification by 
taking into account its own reception capacities and 
families’ capacity to integrate, as evaluated by their 
resources and accommodation in the country of 
destination and, for example, their knowledge of that 
country’s language.  
This is complemented with an allusion to “specific 
measures…that will stress respect for the identities of 
                                                      
16 Council of the EU, Joint Declaration on a Mobility 
Partnership between the European Union and Cape Verde, 
9460/08, Brussels, 21 May 2008. See also Council of the EU, 
Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the 
European Union and Moldova, 9460/08, Brussels, 21 May 2008. The French Presidency’s European Pact on Immigration and Asylum | 5 
the Member States and the EU and for their 
fundamental values”. 
The original draft version of the Pact contained a direct 
reference to an integration contract. This was inspired 
by the current Contrat d’accueil et d’intégration (CAI) 
and the Contrat d’accueil et d’intégration pour la 
famille  (CAIF) currently provided in French 
immigration law.
17 We remind the reader about the 
significance of these two contractual immigration-
control measures at times of restricting access by TCNs 
to security of residence and family reunification in 
France. The allusion to the integration contract was 
finally taken out of the Pact’s wording partly as a 
consequence of the strong opposition by some member 
states, particularly the current Spanish government.
18 
While the disappearance of the contract alleviated the 
‘Frenchness’ inherent in the proposals related to the 
dimension of integration policy, it is worth underlining 
that the current wording of the Pact still refers to 
specific measures to promote language-learning and 
stressing the need to respect the identity of the member 
states, something which in our view allows for, and 
therefore promotes, this kind of state practices. It is 
however to be welcomed that the September version of 
the Pact includes, in contrast with the July one, a new 
sentence stating: 
The European Council also calls upon the 
Member States to take into account, by means 
of appropriate measures, the need to combat 
any forms of discrimination to which migrants 
may be exposed. (Emphasis added.) 
Indeed, one of the central innovative ingredients of the 
Pact is for a particular member state to successfully 
transplant some its own normative and political 
priorities to the EU level. In light of this, the Pact needs 
to be understood as a countervailing strategy in relation 
to the Community method and destined to universalise 
and convert to the European level some ideological 
lines substantiating policies and laws presenting a 
predominantly national character. The French 
understanding of the nature and scope of 
Europeanisation processes over issues related to human 
mobility and diversity weakens the EU political project 
of progressively building a common immigration 
policy. The ‘European’ is in this way instrumentalised 
to legitimise contested national politics in these 
sensitive areas, and even universalises them to the 
                                                      
17 Loi relatif à la maîtrise de l’immigration, à l’intégration et 
à l’asile n° 2007-1631, version consolidée 21 novembre 
2007, (retrievable from http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr). 
18 In fact, the latter had been very critical about a similar 
proposal on an integration contract put forward by the leader of 
the opposition party (Mariano Rajoy, Partido Popular) during 
the pre-election campaign in the beginning of 2008. 
entire EU by becoming part of the European 
immigration and asylum policy. 
2.2. Intergovernmentalism 
The Pact is endowed with an inherently 
intergovernmental nature. While it has been presented 
as ‘European’, we argue, however, that its adoption will 
weaken the possibilities for the EU to fully accomplish 
a ‘common’ and harmonised immigration and asylum 
policy that is coherent, global and integrated. The Pact 
is very much oriented towards the member states and it 
is driven by a predominantly intergovernmental logic 
prioritising the competences of the member states over 
those of an EU at 27. By doing so it fosters the 
predominance of the national level over the policy 
domains of immigration, asylum and borders, which at 
the current stage of European integration, one would 
not really expect! It will boost the ongoing tension 
between the establishment of a European immigration 
and asylum policy and the perpetuation of member 
states’ competences and power of discretion over these 
fields. The significance of the principle of subsidiarity 
will be reinvigorated. The respective interests of some 
member states, and their current governments, will 
constitute one of the key factors guiding the rationale of 
European policies. This will prevent the achievement 
and materialisation of any ‘common’ policy in the 
years to come.  
In the same vein, the Pact reinvigorates the traditional 
struggles between the member states and the EU over 
the competence on immigration, borders and asylum. 
Even though the last draft non-official version of 
September has included new allusions aiming to 
alleviate the original intergovernmentalist logic, and 
which now includes for instance more references to the 
European Commission,
19 the member states’ interests 
and competences over these policy domains are 
undoubtedly the ones being prioritised and promoted.  
For instance, sentences such as the one alluding to the 
member states’ ‘exclusive competence’ over the 
conditions of entry of legal TCNs in the EU are very 
striking.
20 This is particularly so when taking into 
                                                      
19 When comparing the July and September versions of the 
Pact two new references to the European Commission have 
been included in the text: First, in the section dealing with 
legal migration, the new paragraph a) now says “to invite 
Member States and the Commission to implement policies 
for labour migration,...”. Second, the section on migration 
and development, paragraph a) stipulates that “the European 
Council invites the Member States and the Commission to 
inform and consult each other on the objectives and limits of 
such bilateral agreements, and on readmission agreements”.  
20 The precise wording in the Pact reads: “The European 
Council...recalls that it is for each Member State to decide on 
the conditions of admission of legal migrants to its territory, 
and where necessary, to set their number”.  6 | Carrera & Guild 
account Article 63 of the EC Treaty’s recognition of 
EU competence in these domains. This provision leaves 
no doubt about the fact that the conditions of entry are 
not an exclusive competence of the member states, but 
rather one that is shared between the national and the 
supranational realms in the EU setting. This would 
have been more than confirmed with the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty and the new Articles 4.2.j
21 
and 79.2.a and 79.5 of the TEU.
22 Also, the experience 
in these fields over the past 25 years has shown that 
without a strong central impetus, there is no real 
progress towards common objectives in immigration 
and asylum. By advocating the need to strengthen 
national competences, the EU’s project of establishing 
a common immigration and asylum policy 
substantiating the AFSJ will be weakened. 
That notwithstanding, the Pact does not allude to the 
shared nature of the competence over immigration, 
asylum and borders in the EU setting. It does not 
mention that some of these policies have been in fact 
Europeanised since 1999, when the Amsterdam Treaty 
entered into force and the EC Treaty was given a new 
Title IV on “Visas, Asylum, Immigration and other 
Policies related to Free Movement of Persons”. In this 
manner the Pact fails to acknowledge the role that the 
EU is already having in areas beyond the establishment 
of the free movement of persons, the lifting of the EU 
internal borders controls and the common external 
borders control, such as that labelled “legal migration”. 
Also, as pointed out in Section I of this Policy Brief, all 
too often the Pact fails to refer to the adopted EU laws 
(Directive on the right to family reunification) and 
existing initiatives (e.g. the EU Blue Card).  
The Pact should acknowledge that during the last nine 
years the EU has already developed various 
supranational responses limiting the power of 
discretion and sovereignty of the member states in 
legislating on immigration, asylum and borders. For 
instance, while the Pact mentions the need to further 
restrict family reunification, what remains arguable is 
the extent to which the member states’ are completely 
                                                      
21 Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed 
at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, OJ C306/01, Volume 50, 17 
December 2007. Article 4.2 says that “Shared competence 
between the Union and the Member States applies in the 
following principal areas: j. Area of freedom, security and 
justice”. See Carrera & Geyer (2008).  
22 Article 79.2.a stipulates that “the European Parliament and 
the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, shall adopt measures in the following 
areas: a) the conditions of entry and residence”. Article 79.5 
provides: “This article shall not affect the right of Member 
States to determine volumes of admission of third-country 
nationals coming from third countries to their territory in 
order to seek work”. 
free to do so and assess their own ‘integration 
capacities’ for family members in particular regarding 
support and accommodation needs and language 
knowledge. The adoption of the Council Directive on 
the right to family reunification has meant a transfer to 
the EU level of the sovereignty over the set of 
conditions, standards and rights conferred to family 
members of TCNs in the EU. This was recognised by 
the judgement of the ECJ on European Parliament v. 
Council, Case C-540/03 of 27 June 2006.
23 
In addition to the above, the following question might 
be posed: Does the EU need the Pact? The official goal 
purported by its current wording is that while in the last 
twenty years progress has been reached toward a 
common immigration and asylum policy, the latter is 
still considered to be insufficient. The Pact identifies 
five concrete successes of EU migration and asylum 
policy: the abolition of intra-member state border 
controls on the movement of persons; the adoption of a 
common visa; the common external border control 
policy and asylum rules; cooperation in the fight 
against irregular migration; and the creation of 
FRONTEX and the establishment of funds for 
solidarity among the member states. However, it calls 
upon the European Council to promote a “new 
impetus”  
in a spirit of mutual responsibility and 
solidarity between Member States and of 
partnership with third countries, …to the 
definition of a common immigration and 
asylum policy that will take account of both 
the collective interest of the European Union 
and the specific needs to the Member States. 
In light of this, where does the Pact fit within the 
evolving common EU immigration policy and the 
existing evaluation mechanisms and political processes 
embedded in the EU multi-annual programmes on an 
AFSJ? As the Pact also clearly acknowledges,
24 the EU 
already reckons with the proper policy framework for 
reviewing the achievements in the implementation of 
AFSJ-related policies in the context of the second 
multi-annual Programme on policies related to 
Freedom, Security and Justice – the Hague 
                                                      
23 In this ruling the Court of Luxembourg held for instance that 
“the Directive imposes precise positive obligations, with 
corresponding clearly defined individual rights, on the Member 
States, since it requires them, in the cases determined by the 
Directive, to authorise family reunification of certain members 
of the sponsor’s family, without being left a margin of 
appreciation”. 
24 In stating: “The European Council particularly welcomes the 
major advances achieved under the Tampere (1999-2003) and 
Hague (2004-2009) programmes, which it undertakes to fully 
implement.” The French Presidency’s European Pact on Immigration and Asylum | 7 
Programme.
25 The European Commission evaluates on 
an annual basis the progress achieved in the level of 
policy convergence over these domains, as exemplified 
by the Communication on the Report on 
Implementation of the Hague Programme for 2007.
26 
For all these reasons, it is in our view difficult to argue 
the added value of the European Pact on Immigration 
and Asylum, taking into account the existing normative 
and institutional setting of migration, borders and 
asylum in the EU legal system. 
III.  The Pact and the European 
Commission 
The French political drive might have been conceived 
by the European Commission as a unique opportunity 
to boost the ‘added value’ of a common EU 
immigration and asylum policy. The Pact might have 
been regarded as a perfect occasion to move the politics 
around Europeanisation forward over domains where 
some member states are still hesitant about the need to 
have ‘more Europe’. While qualified majority voting 
and co-decision already apply to most of the areas 
falling within the scope of Title IV of the EC Treaty, 
the field of legal immigration is still subject to the 
unanimity rule and consultation with the EP. It is also 
true that these institutional and decision-making 
configurations, some of which would have been solved 
with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, make 
the role of the EU, and more particularly that of the 
European Commission, weak in respect of areas as 
important as labour immigration. The current decision-
making and institutional landscape, however, should 
not have justified the Commission’s confidence about 
the compatibility and potential positive effects of the 
paradigms and proposals provided by the Pact over its 
own strategies. 
The tensions between the Pact and the EU become 
evident, for instance, when comparing the former with 
the Commission Communications, and more 
particularly with the one dealing with immigration: A 
Common Immigration Policy in Europe: Principles, 
Actions and Tools of 17
th June 2008.
27 This 
Communication stipulates its new political vision for 
                                                      
25 Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 4 and 5 
November 2004, 14292/1/04, Brussels, 8 December 2004, 
Annex I, ‘The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, 
Security and Justice in the European Union’, point 1.5. 
European Council, the Hague Programme: Strengthening 
Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union, 
2005/C53/01, OJ C53/1, 3.3.2005. 
26 Commission Communication, Report on the Implementation 
of the Hague Programme for 2007, COM(2008)373 final, 2 July 
2008, Brussels. 
27 Commission Communication, A Common Immigration Policy 
for Europe: Principles, Actions and Tools, COM(2008) 359 
final, 17.6.2008, Brussels.  
the development of a common EU immigration policy 
in the years to come. It specifically identified ten 
common principles around which the common 
immigration policy is expected to be articulated and 
grouped them under three main headings: prosperity, 
security and solidarity.  
What might be some of the main points of friction 
between the Pact and the Commission Communication? 
The Communication calls for EU and member states’ 
actions at a time of defining “clear and transparent rules 
for the entry and residence” of TCNs, “including for 
exercising a paid or self-employed activity”. Moreover, 
and unlike the Pact, the European Commission 
attributes more importance to the equal and fair 
treatment paradigm that should have inspired EU 
common policy responses on human mobility after the 
Tampere Programme agreed by the Council in May 
1999.
28 In contrast to the July version of the Pact, the 
September version has now introduced the following 
sentence: “The European Council stresses the 
importance of adopting a policy that enables fair 
treatment of migrants.” This new sentence is welcome, 
yet it does not go far enough. The European 
Commission presented a proposal in October 2007 for a 
Council Directive on a single procedure for a single 
permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in 
the territory of a member state and on a common set of 
rights for third-country workers legally residing in a 
member state,
29 which the Pact does not mention at all. 
In addition, the Commission Communication calls upon 
the European Council to adopt the set of common 
principles which would constitute the basis upon which 
the common immigration policy will be taken forward. 
The Commission proposed that this process will occur 
through “coordinated and coherent action” by the EU 
and its member states and by setting up a “common 
methodology” consisting of the translation of the 
common principles into common objectives and 
indicators that would ensure their implementation. The 
Commission would elaborate an annual report on the 
basis of the implementation of the common objectives 
and member states’ “national immigration profiles”. 
The implementation of the “concrete actions” would be 
                                                      
28 This is exemplified by the following statement: “Fair 
treatment of third-country nationals who reside legally on the 
territory of the Member States should be ensured, with the aim 
of approximating their legal status to that of EU nationals.” 
29 Proposal for a Council Directive on a single application 
procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to 
reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a 
common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing 
in a Member State, COM(2007) 638 final, Brussels, 23.10.2007. 
See EESC, Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive on a 
single application procedure for a single permit for third-country 
nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State 
and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally 
residing in a Member State, SOC(307), 9
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monitored, on the basis of a Commission report, on an 
annual basis by the Spring European Council, which 
would be carrying out a “political assessment of the 
situation at European and national levels” and put 
forward recommendations. 
In comparison, the final paragraph of the July version 
of the draft Pact called the European Council to:  
hold an annual debate on immigration and 
asylum policies. To that end, it requests the 
Council,  together with the Commission, to 
present  a report each year on the 
implementation of the commitments contained 
in the present Pact. Furthermore, it invites 
Member States to devise quantitative 
indicators to assess the impact and 
effectiveness of their policies and to keep each 
other informed of any new measure or 
legislative reform they intend to enact. 
(Emphasis added.)  
By contrast, the last non-official version made public at 
the beginning of September has amended this very 
paragraph as follows: 
hold an annual debate on immigration and 
asylum policies. To that end, it invites the 
Commission to present a report to the Council 
each year, based on Member States’ 
contributions and accompanied, as necessary, 
by proposals for recommendations, on the 
implementation,  by both the Union and its 
Member States, of this Pact and of the 
programme that will follow on from the Hague 
programme. This annual debate will also 
enable the European Council to be kept 
informed of the most significant developments 
planned by each Member State in conducting 
its immigration and asylum policy. To prepare 
for this debate, the European Council invites 
the Commission to propose a tracking method 
to the Council. (Emphasis added.)  
Even though the September version is more in line with 
some of the elements comprising the Communication 
COM(2008) 359, the Pact does not go as far as the 
‘common methodology’ backing up the Commission’s 
aspirations. What is also uncertain is the extent to 
which the member states would accept the indirect 
harmonisation of a coordination regime or ‘tracking 
method’ proposed by the Communication, taking into 
account the failure of a similar Communication on an 
Open Method of Coordination for the Community 
Immigration Policy.
30 This former Communication, 
which also intended to apply an open method of 
                                                      
30 Commission Communication on an Open Method of 
Coordination for the Community Immigration Policy, 
COM(2001)387, Brussels, 11.7.2001. 
coordination to immigration policies, was not even 
discussed inside the Council rooms. 
IV.  The Pact: Security vs. Rights? 
The Pact draws inspiration from a metaphor of balance, 
which has in recent years constituted one of the 
foundations of EU policies dealing with the fields of 
Freedom, Security and Justice. CHALLENGE 
(Changing Landscape of European Liberty and 
Security), a five-year project funded by DG Research of 
the European Commission, has provided an 
interdisciplinary academic critique of this metaphor in 
relation to the AFSJ,
31 which arguably has been 
damaging for the legitimacy of the EU’s AFSJ. It 
entered EU discourse after the attack of 11
th September 
and became incorporated into the second five-year 
work programme that commenced in 2004 – The 
Hague Programme.
32 At the heart of the problem of this 
metaphor is the illusion that liberty and security are 
similar types of concepts and therefore can be 
compared and weighed one against the other.
33 What is 
common to all the conceptions of liberty is that it is one 
of the core values of democracy, rule of law and 
fundamental rights that are designed to protect the 
liberty of the individual within society. Security, on the 
other hand, is not a value as such, something that is not 
evident from the way in which security is framed and 
understood by the Pact, where the notion of state 
security prevails. 
The Pact is inspired by, and promotes, the narrative of a 
balance in respect to policies related to human mobility 
and diversity. For instance, the introductory paragraphs 
of the Pact make reference to the ways in which 
international migration contributes to economic growth. 
It then makes the equation with the justification of a 
global approach to migration policy, calling for better 
management and control (control of irregular 
immigration and border-related/security policies). This 
is complemented with the following sentence: “The EU 
does not have the resources to decently receive all 
migrants hoping to find a better life here”. Another 
example is the way in which it presents the relationship 
                                                      
31 See: www.libertysecurity.org  
32 In particular, the Hague Programme stated that “The European 
Council requests the Council to examine how to maximise the 
effectiveness and interoperability of EU information systems in 
tackling illegal immigration and improving border controls as 
well as the management of these systems on the basis of a 
communication by the Commission on the interoperability 
between the Schengen Information System (SIS II), the Visa 
Information System (VIS) and EURODAC to be released in 
2005, taking into account the need to strike the right balance 
between law enforcement purposes and safeguarding the 
fundamental rights of individuals” in the section entitled 
“Strengthening Freedom”. 
33 Bigo et al., (2007). The French Presidency’s European Pact on Immigration and Asylum | 9 
between the freedom to move and the need to ensure 
compensatory security measures. 
The understanding of balance in the Pact comes into 
sharp focus when looking at the relatively few 
references made to the rights and liberties of TCNs. It 
is not only that the Pact does not mention the 
Commission Proposal on a Common Framework of 
Rights highlighted above, but its wording refuses to 
identify the respect of human rights and the respect of 
the rule of law as one of the key principles, and ‘basic 
commitments’, of any future common policy on 
migration, borders and asylum. The difficult 
relationship between the securitarian rationale of the 
Pact with liberty, human rights and the rule of law, has 
been equally a subject of concern by many civil society 
organisations and NGOs across the EU.
34 As the 
European Network Against Racism (ENAR) (2008), 
has proposed, the Pact should at least include a sixth 
principle that could read: 
European Law, Policy and Practice in 
Immigration and Asylum shall respect, protect 
and fulfil the rights of all and will not 
undermine the vision of a Europe without 
Racism.
35 
V.  Conclusions and Policy 
Recommendations 
The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum is far 
from being an initiative endowed with a truly European 
nature. It is in fact guided by the principles of 
nationalism and intergovernmentalism. These 
principles are difficult to reconcile with the building of 
a common European policy on migration, borders and 
asylum. The rationale and driving logic of the Pact 
bring legitimacy to certain policy responses and 
national practices of particular member states at the EU 
level, and aim at universalising them in an enlarged 
Europe. The added value of the Pact is also rather 
questionable, taking into account the existing 
normative, policy and institutional settings surrounding 
the domains of migration, borders and asylum in the 
EU legal system. 
Furthermore, the European Commission might have 
overestimated the negative implications of the French 
Presidency’s strategy. The logic of the Commission and 
that of the Pact appear to be moving in two different 
directions. The Pact will give strength to a competing 
model of cooperation to that promulgated by the 
Community method of cooperation. This model 
prioritises national competence over that of the EU in 
relation to immigration and asylum-related fields, 
something which at the current stage in the European 
                                                      
34 By way of illustration, see AEDH (2008)and Cimade (2008). 
35 ENAR (2008). 
integration process is not only surprising, but also 
regrettable. The adoption of the Pact by the European 
Council will reinvigorate the relevance of the principle 
of subsidiarity over these policy domains in the years to 
come. This will weaken the construction of a common 
AFSJ where the European interests are duly 
safeguarded, promoted and developed.  
On the basis of the above, we put forward the following 
policy recommendations: 
1.  The balance metaphor between freedom and 
security guiding the Pact creates a critical tension in 
respect of liberty, human rights and the security of the 
individual. The Pact should include a sixth principle 
referring to the need that any future policy and legal 
instrument to be adopted in the future common 
immigration and asylum policy should comply as a 
premise with fundamental rights, the fair and equal 
treatment paradigm, the rule of law and non-
discrimination and racism. 
2.  The Pact should acknowledge the degree of 
Europeanisation that has already taken place in all the 
areas related to immigration, borders and asylum, 
including that of legal immigration. An express 
reference should be made to those legislative measures 
adopted, or being proposed, as well as the proactive 
interpretation provided by the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice. 
3.  The wording of the Pact should also emphasise 
the shared competence between the EU and its member 
states over these domains. The current format 
overemphasises the exclusivity of the competence of 
the member states over that of the EU. It should also 
highlight the added value of a truly ‘common’ 
European policy on immigration and asylum, where the 
needs of the entire EU, and not those of a few member 
states as perceived by current governments, would be 
the guiding principle.  
4.  The European Commission should play a more 
critical role in respect of these kinds of nationalistic and 
intergovernmental initiatives. It should continue to take 
a proactive and forward-looking position in fostering 
common European responses. The latter might not 
necessarily follow current priorities and political 
strategies of particularly powerful member states’ 
authorities. A policy ‘making sense’ in, and being in 
the interests of, the entire EU at 27 should be preferred.  
5.  The democratic deficit affecting some of the 
policies dealing with immigration, and especially those 
related to legal immigration and integration, should be 
overcome. It is also fundamental that the European 
Parliament, which is gradually becoming one of the 
central actors in policies related to an AFSJ, would be 
directly involved in the political processes that will lead 10 | Carrera & Guild 
to the successor of The Hague Programme and the 
future European policy on immigration.
36  
6.  The role of civil society, NGOs and the social 
partners is of utmost importance in order to ensure that 
the common EU immigration and asylum policy take 
on board social realities and needs, and is not only 
driven by governmental interests and opportunistic 
political visions. Civil society and the social partners 
need to be given a real voice in the policy processes 
leading to the next multi-annual programme related to 
an AFSJ, and particularly in the setting up of the 
guiding principles that will shape its development in 
the years to come.  
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